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1991 LEGISLATION, REPORTS AND DEBATES OVER
FEDERALLY FUNDED ART: ARTS COMMUNITY LEFT
WITH AN "INDECENT" COMPROMISE
Art does not have to be liked or beautiful or innocent to be art. It
must, however, be seen or heard, and it must strike your soul, your
mind or both. Good art moves your emotions or makes you think.
We should be ever thankful that we have artists among us who can
make us cry, scream, or wonder. Disliked art and art with disliked
subjects can be as powerful as liked art, sometimes more powerful.
It deserves both our attention and our protection.'
Since June 1989, several federally funded artists in the United States
have commanded national attention for their controversial creations of art.2
1. Harris, It Takes Practice and Serious Thought to Learn How to Dislike Art Properly,
THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 19, 1990, at A56 (discussing ways in which one
may dislike art and recommending government support of arts without content restrictions).
2. See Posner, Art for Law's Sake, THE AmaEicAN SCHOLAR, at 513 (Autumn 1989)
(discussing "persistent, perhaps intensify controversy over offensive art") The works of art
most particularly in controversy include the exhibition "Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect
Moment," and artist Andre Serrano's photographic work "Piss Christ." Id. Mapplethorpe's
exhibition consists of several photographs of homoerotic and sadomasochistic images. Id.; see
also Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YAix L.J. 1359, 1370 (1990)
[hereinafter Post-Modern Art] (discussing adequacy of current legislation for judging contem-
porary art in light of recent controversial works). Two of the photographs considered most
offensive include an image of a whip protruding from a man's anus, and an image of a man's
testicles bound in leather. Id. Serrano's "Piss Christ" is a photographic collage depiction of
a crucifix submerged in the artist's urine. Posner, Art for Law's Sake, at 513. But see Harris,
supra note 1, at A56 (discussing work of Andre Serrano). Writing about the artistic value of
"Piss Christ," Harris states that individuals will interpret "Piss Christ" according to their
own personal beliefs, but that "no individual work of art can legitimately be disliked without
being seen, heard or read." Id.
See also Art and Outrage in the Nation's Capital; No Sex Please, We're American, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1989, at 111 (discussing political reactions to Robert Mapplethorpe's and
Andre Serrano's controversial works). Following Congress' voiced displeasure over funding by
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) of the Mapplethorpe exhibition, the Corcoran
Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. canceled plans to exhibit the Mapplethorpe photographs
during the summer of 1989. Id. Following the cancellation of the exhibition by the Corcoran,
artists boycotted exhibiting at the museum and artist Lowell Nesbitt wrote the Corcoran out
of his will. Id. The Washington Project for the Arts showed the exhibition instead. Id.
See also Parachini, NEA Gives Grants to Groups Targeted by Conservatives; Arts: Some
Organizations That Played Key Roles in the Political Controversy Receive Funding. Museum
Rallies to the Defense of Embattled Cincinnati Gallery, L.A. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at Fl,
col. 2 (discussing indictment for obscenity charges previous week of Cincinnati museum and
director). When the exhibition subsequently travelled to the Cincinnati Arts Center in April
1990, a Cincinnati grand jury indicted the Arts Center and its director, David Barrie, of
obscenity charges for the display of five of the seventy-five photographs in the exhibition. Id.;
Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y. Times,
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People may label these creations as "disliked art" or "art with disliked
subjects," 3 and consequently, the government has given these works of art
limited protection because of such a classification.4 Some members of the
Oct. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (discussing acquittal of Cincinnati Arts Center and Director as
vindication against anti-pornography groups in Cincinnati). A jury later acquitted the Arts
Center and Barrie of the obscenity charges. Id.
See also Hubbard, Small, Micheli & Sellinger, Bending to the Political Winds, The NEA
Cuts Off Grants to Four Artists Amid Charges of Censorship, PEOPLE, Aug. 6, 1990, at 93
(interviewing and discussing controversial performance art of Karen Finley, Tim Miller, John
Fleck and Holly Hughes and denial of grants by NEA to these artists). Various performance
artists also received media attention for what they perform on stage. Id. Karen Finley uses
her body to re-create the emotional realities of sexual abuse. Id. Finley's controversial show,
"We Keep Our Victims Ready," contains three segments. Id. In the second segment, Finley
visually recounts a sexual assault by stripping to the waist and smearing chocolate on her
breasts and by using profanity to describe the assault. Id. Holly Hughes' monologue "World
Without End" is a somewhat graphic recollection of the artist's realization of her lesbianism
and reminiscence of her mother's sexuality. Id. John Fleck, in his stage performance "Blessed
Are All the Little Fishes," confronts alcoholism and Catholicism. Id. During the course of
the performance, Fleck appears dressed as a mermaid, urinates on the stage and creates an
altar out of a toilet bowl by putting a photograph of Jesus Christ on the lid. Id. Tim Miller
derives his performance "Some Golden States" from childhood experiences, from his life as
a homosexual, and from the constant threat of AIDS. Id. Miller uses vegetables in his
performances to represent sexual symbols. Id.; infra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing
denial by NEA grants to above four artists).
3. See Harris, supra note 1, at A56 (discussing public's dislike of Andre Serrano's "Piss
Christ"). Harris, writing specifically about "Piss Christ," states that individuals will dislike
the work because it is a defamation of religious beliefs and because the artist used his own
udrine in its creation. Id.
4. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304 (1989) [hereinafter Appropriations Act of 1990] (providing that
no federal funds appropriated to NEA may promote art which NEA judges obscene). Section
304(a) states:
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment for
the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be used to promote,
disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of the National Endowment
for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be considered
obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism,
the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which,
when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Appropriations Act of 1990, § 304(a).
Subsequent to public debate over the use of government funds for exhibition of contro-
versial works of art, Congress revoked funding for the exhibition of Mapplethorpe and Serrano
works in question and passed legislation restricting funding by the NEA of "obscene art."
Id.; See also Parachini, NEA Nominee Hearing Opens on Cordial Note, L.A. Times, Sept.
23, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LAT File (discussing opposition by President's
nominee Director of NEA to Congressional proposals to restrict federally funded art); Scally,
Congressional Panel Compromises on Funding for "Obscene" Art, Reuter Library Report,
Sept. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (discussing Helms amendment
as finally adopted into 1990 Appropriations Bill).
A separate amendment to the 1990 Appropriations Bill called for a five year ban of grants
by the NEA to two regional arts organizations that organized exhibitions by Robert Mapple-
thorpe and Andre Serrano, the Institute for Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania
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public view this limited protection as government censorship of the arts,
and the Southeastern Center for Contemporary Art in Winston Salem, North Carolina,
respectively. See Parachini, NEA Nominee Hearing Opens on Cordial Note (discussing funding
ban to museums). While Congress ultimately disapproved of the five year ban on federal
funding to the above mentioned two arts organizations, Congress did cut $45,000 in funding
to the NEA. See Scally, Congressional Panel Compromises on Funding for "Obscene" Art
(discussing Congressional reaction to controversial art exhibitions). The $45,000 represents the
combined amount of the two grants to the Institute for Contemporary Art and the Southeastern
Center for Contemporary Art that supported the Mapplethorpe and Serrano exhibitions. Id.
See also Parachini & Goldman, L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1989, at A4, col. 4 (discussing
reconsideration and announcement by NEA to fund Artists Space). In November 1989 the
Chairman of the NEA, John Frohnmayer, impounded funding to Artists Space. Id. Artists
Space, a Manhattan gallery, scheduled a controversial exhibition about AIDS, titled "Witnesses:
Against Our Vanishing." Id. Frohnmayer later rescinded the impoundment of the grant money
to Artists Space. Id. Frohnmayer received criticism for allowing political views to influence
his decision to withhold federal funding for controversial art. Id.
See also Parachini, GAO Opens Investigation Into Funding of 'Obscene' Art, L.A. Times,
Mar. 24, 1990, at F13, col. 5 (discussing investigation by General Accounting Office in response
to letter from Senator Helms asking for inquiry into possible violations of law by NEA). In
March 1990, the U.S. General Accounting Office began an investigation of alleged improper
funding of obscene works of art by the NEA. Id. Senator Helms, in a letter to the General
Accounting Office, listed nine exhibitions that allegedly received funding in violation of the
1990 appropriations bill. Id. In particular, Senator Helms raised questions about the funding
of "Witnesses: Against Our Vanishing," and also "Modem Primitives," at the Center on
Contemporary Art in Seattle, Washington. Id.
See also Ament, Seattle to Join Art Rallies, Seattle Times, Mar. 19, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATT File (discussing protests across United States scheduled for
March 20, 1990 against threat of government art censorship and controversy over "Modem
Primitives" exhibition). The "Modem Primitives" show documented "contemporary body
modification" that included tatoos and piercing of genitals. Id.
See also Bargreen, The Embattled Arts Agency Finds Itself Surrounded on all Sides as
Its Reauthorization Vote Draws Near-Targeting the NEA, Seattle Times Company, July 22,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SEATr File [hereinafter The Embattled Arts Agency]
(discussing controversy over NEA and views of members of Congress regarding reauthorization
of NEA). In July 1990, following Frohnmayer's decision to overturn recommendations by
panel members of the NEA to grant funds to four performance artists, Karen Finley, John
Fleck, Tim Miller and Holly Hughes, angry artists demanded the resignation of Frohnmayer.
Id. Three of the four artists are homosexual, and the work of these artists deals explicitly
with their sexuality. Id.; Hubbard, Small, Micheli & Sellinger, Bending to the Political Winds,
the NEA Cuts Off Grants to Four Artists Amid Charges of Censorship, supra note 2, at 93
(interviewing and discussing controversial performance art of Karen Finley, Tim Miller, John
Fleck and Holly Hughes and denial of grants by NEA to these artists). The NEA awarded
Holly Hughes a $15,000 playwriting grant in March 1990, after members of the NEA viewed
her performance "World Without End." Id. However, the chairman of the NEA denied
Hughes a second grant for $5,000 in July 1990 despite recommendations for the grant by the
NEA review panel. Id. Similarly, the NEA previously awarded Tim Miller four grants, but
denied Miller funding for "Some Golden States." Id. Karen Finley also received two prior
grants totalling $10,000 from the NEA, but she did not receive funding for "We Keep Our
Victims Ready." Id.; supra note 2 (describing these four artists' controversial performance
art).
See also Stimpson, The Arts-Endowment Crisis is the Latest Encounter in the Battle
Between Freedom and Fear; Higher Education Must Join the Fray, Tan CHRON. OF HIOHER
EDUCATION, Sept. 26, 1990, at BI [hereinafter Arts-Endowment Crisis] (discussing controversy
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criticizing members of Congress for responding bureaucratically to the
members' personal tastes in art.'
In October 1989 Congress approved an amendment to the appropriations
bill for the fiscal year 1990 that placed content restrictions against obscenity
in art funded by federal grants. 6 Congress considered the amendment directly
in response to Senate and House members' displeasure of funding of the
Robert Mapplethorpe and Andre Serrano exhibitions by the National En-
dowment for the Arts (the NEA).7 After Congress passed the 1990 appro-
priations bill, the NEA required grant recipients to sign an anti-obscenity
pledge as a condition to receiving government funds. 8
The arts community and members of the public reacted to both the
restriction and pledge in an uproar.9 Protest and political debate ensued
throughout the fiscal year.10 Artists criticized the government action as a
over reauthorization of NEA and urging higher education to take action against content
restrictions). Stimpson writes that the debate over the NEA is a "toxic-waste dump of rhetoric,"
stating that as a result of the debate, Karen Finley, as a serious performance artist, "has been
denigrated as a chocolate-covered porn queen." Id.; Sherman, NEA Grant Provisos Attacked
in Courts, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 12, col. 2 (discussing pending litigation against NEA
and its Director, John Frohnmayer). These four performance artists who were denied funding,
called the "NEA Four," subsequently filed suit against the NEA and Frohnmayer alleging the
denial occurred on the basis of the artists' sexual politics. Id.
5. See Toner, In North Carolina's Senate Race, A Divisive TV Fight Over Values, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (discussing countercharges between senatorial candidates
Jesse Helms and Harvey Gantt). Gantt attempted to present Helms as a candidate who
prioritized his personal "crusades" over the needs of North Carolina. Id. at A32, col. 2.
These crusades included those against the NEA for funding Helms's own perception of obscene
art. Id.; see also Boyer, Mean for Jesus, Vz nry FAia, Sept. 1990, at 224 (examining Helms's
crusade against NEA in wake of senatorial race against Gantt).
6. See Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(a); see also 135 Cong. Rec.
S8862 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (Helms Amendment No. 420). Senator Helms proposed an
amendment to the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
1990. Helms Amendment No. 420. Senator Helms's original amendment sought to prohibit
funding of "obscene" and "indecent" works of art, and "material which denigrates the
objects or beliefs of the adherents of a particular religion or nonreligion" and "material which
denigrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or class of citizens on the basis of race, creed,
sex, handicap, age or national origin." Id.; infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing
language of 1990 Appropriations Act). The approved Appropriations Act of 1990 rejected
Senator Helms's extensively restrictive language, but did maintain a prohibition against art
deemed "obscene" by the NEA. Appropriations Act of 1990, § 304(a).
7. See Horn & Plattner, Should Congress Censor Art ?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPoRT,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 22 (reporting House vote in favor of Senator Helms's amendment into
Congressional appropriations bill and discussing amendment in response to Congressional
displeasure with federal funding spent on exhibition of works by Robert Mapplethorpe and
Andre Serrano).
8. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (describing language of pledge require-
ment).
9. See generally Horn & Plattner, Should Congress Censor Art?, supra note 7, at 22
(reporting public response to Helms amendment). The MARS Artspace in Phoenix, Arizona
displayed "Piss Helms," a work that portrayed a photograph of Senator Helms submerged in
a urine-like substance. Id.
10. See Ament, Seattle to Join Art Rallies, supra note 4 (discussing protests scheduled
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denial of an individual's right to freedom of expression, and several arts
organizations protested by refusing grants from the NEA. 1 Members of
across United States in response to perceived government censorship of arts). Demonstrations
and rallies planned by organizations such as the Arts Coalition for Cultural Freedom expressed
concern over governmental action restricting federal funding of the arts. Id.
Compare Helms, Art, the First Amendment, and the NEA Controversy-Tax-Paid Ob-
scenity, 14 NOVA L.J. 317 (1990) [hereinafter Tax-Paid Obscenity] (concluding that government
should not support art that is offensive to public) with About Washington, Chi. Trib., Apr.
22, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CHTRIB File (discussing pol sponsored by
lobbying group fighting Helms's effort to place restrictions on NEA) and Mathews, Fine Art
or Foul? In Galleries, Theaters, Congress and the Courts, a Battle Over Freedom of Expression
is Raging, Nwsvann, July 2, 1990, at 46 [hereinafter Fine Art or Foul] (discussing poll
conducted by Gallup Organization following recent controversial grants by NEA and obscenity
charges against rap group 2 Live Crew for group's allegedly obscene lyrics). Helms states that
"[t]he enormous response I have received from throughout the country indicates that the vast
majority of Americans support my amendment because they were aghast to learn that their
tax money has been used to reward artists who had elected to depict sadomasochism, perverted
homoerotic acts, and sexual exploitation of children." Helms, Tax-Paid Obscenity, at 319.
In contrast, the results of the poll conducted by Research and Forecasts, Inc. of 1,200
people showed that ninety-three percent believe that "freedom of expression is essential to
artists and the arts" and that eighty-one percent oppose Congressional action to "interfere
with our rights to free expression." See About Washington (stating results of poll). Additionally,
the Gallup Poll, taken June 20-21, 1990, asked, "With federal funding of arts projects, should
federal officials exercise more control to ensure that the works of art don't offend the public?
Or should these judgments be left to independent panels of established arts experts in each
field?" Mathews, Fine Art or Foul?, at 50. Sixty-three percent of the 605 adults surveyed
responded "Let Experts Judge," compared to thirty percent who thought that "More Official
Control" was necessary. Id. Seventy-five percent also felt that it was more important that
individuals have the right to determine what they may see or hear, rather than allowing
"society to impose laws prohibiting material offensive to some segments of the community."
Id.
In June 1990 protests again coincided with Congressional hearings in Washington, D.C.
about the reauthorization of the NEA. See Grant, Art Works Covered to Show Support for
the NAA, Proprietary to the United Press International, June 7, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting Arts Day USA demonstrations taking place in Ohio and
around United States in response to proposed Congressional legislation to curtail operation of
NEA). Museums in Ohio covered sculptures and paintings with black cloth to demonstrate the
effects of Congressional efforts to disband the NEA; Grant, Art Works Off-Limits to Show
Support for NBA, Proprietary to the United Press International, June 8, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting about Arts Day USA demonstrations taking place
in Virginia in response to proposed Congressional legislation to curtail operation of NEA). In
Virginia, museums hung yellow tape across gallery entrances and dimmed the lights of several
galleries. Id.
11. See Grant, Papp Nixes Federal Grants Until Obscenity Restrictions are Lifted,
Proprietary to United Press International, Apr. 27, 1990 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (discussing rejection of $50,000 grant received from NEA by director Joseph Papp
of Public Theater in New York); Personalities, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1990, at C3, col. 3
(discussing Papp's refusal of grants and 1991 budget legislation for NEA). Papp later turned
down another grant, a refusal totalling $323,000, after Congress failed to delete any restrictions
to the NEA in the fiscal budget for 1991. Id. Papp's decision was the largest rejection of a
federal grant since the controversy over the NEA began last year. Id.; Mathews, Fine Art or
Foul?, supra note 10, at 51-52 (discussing recipient's refusal of NEA grants). In addition to
the rejection by Papp, The Paris Review and the University of Iowa Press also turned down
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Congress drafted new legislation in anticipation of the September 1990
reauthorization of the NEA.' 2 A Congressionally appointed task force, the
Independent Commission, submitted a report to Congress in September 1990
recommending that Congress reauthorize the NEA without any funding
restrictions. 3 In response to several actions brought against the NEA by
arts organizations, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California later invalidated the NEA pledge requirement.' 4
The Senate and House of Representatives subsequently approved legis-
lation, which the members of Congress heralded as a compromise between
current and proposed legislation, to reauthorize the NEA and to delete
explicit restrictions on the kinds of art that the NEA may fund. 5 The
adopted bill, however, contains a "decency provision," which requires the
chairman of the NEA to ensure that grants are made "... taking into
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs
NEA grants in protest of the pledge requirement, and the University of California, Los
Angeles, planned to convince the other schools in the California system to do the same. Id.
at 52; Art Not for Politicians' Sake, L.A. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at B6, col. I (discussing
criteria as artistic excellence versus political standards in NEA funding process, and Leonard
Bernstein's reaction to NEA grant restrictions). Conductor Leonard Bernstein refused accep-
tance of the National Medal of Arts, which President Bush planned to present at a ceremony
at the White House. Id. Bernstein acted in protest to Chairman of the NEA John Frohnmayer's
decision to initially withhold funding to Artists Space for the show "Witnesses: Against Our
Vanishing." Id.
See also Stimpson, Arts-Endowment. Crisis, supra note 4, at B2 (discussing controversy
over reauthorization of NEA and urging higher education to take action against content
restrictions). The author states that higher education has taken a "modest" involvement in
the reauthorization debate, and suggests that colleges and universities should follow the steps
that other individuals and institutions had taken during the year such as lobbying Congress,
rejecting grants and going to court. Id.
12. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legislation to
reauthorize NEA).
13. See The Independent Commission, A Report to Congress on the National Endowment
for the Arts (September 1990) [hereinafter Independent Commission Report] (discussing NEA
funding and recommending considerations for NEA reauthorization that included deletion of
content restrictions); see also infra notes 59-87, 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing
creation of Independent Commission through 1990 Appropriations Act and Independent
Commission's specific recommendations to Congress).
14. See Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F.Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(holding NEA pledge requirement unconstitutional because pledge had chilling effect upon
artists' expression and was vague); see also infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text (discussing
facts of case and court's rationale in holding pledge requirement unconstitutional); Pinsky,
U.S. Will Not Appeal Ruling on NEA Grants, L.A. Times, June 21, 1991, at F22, col. 1
(stating that Justice Department announced decision not to appeal decision holding NEA anti-
obscenity pledge unconstitutional).
15. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub.
L. No. 101-512 [H.R. 5769], Title I - Amendments to the National Foundation on the Arts
and Humanities Act of 1965 (November 5, 1990) [hereinafter Appropriations Act of 1991]
(reauthorizing NEA); See also Masters, Congress Approves Funding Compromise, Wash. Post,
Oct. 28, 1990, at A17, col. 2 (discussing NEA funding in approved Appropriations Act of
1991); see also infra notes 16-19, 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing additional provisions
of 1991 funding bill of NEA).
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and values of the American people."' 6 The language of the bill may sound
like a compromise to members of Congress, particularly in comparison to
some of the more restrictive legislation proposed. 17 The NEA no longer
requires a federally funded artist, before the creation of a work of art, to
sign a pledge which states that the artist will not use the funds from the
NEA to create something that may later be deemed obscene."8 Instead, the
NEA now will screen potential grant recipients and weed out possible
indecency in the art that the agency decides to fund.' 9 Such censoring
permitted by the new legislation is not a compromise at all.
20
A comparison of the constitutionality of the language of the Appro-
priations Acts of 1990 and 1991 reveals that, with the strings attached to
the 1991 reauthorization of the NEA, the 1991 Appropriations Act actually
is not a compromise. 21 Although the Appropriations Act of 1990, the so-
called Helms Amendment, and the consequential pledge requirement that
followed contained questionable violations of the First Amendment,22 the
16. See Appropriations Act of 1991, supra, § 103, National Endowment for the Arts
(granting authority to NEA to provide financial assistance under certain conditions). Section
103 states:
(b) Artistic Excellence and Obscene Matter.-Section 5(d) of the National Foundation
on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 954(d) is amended to read
as follows:
"(d) No payment shall be made under this section except upon application
therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in accor-
dance with regulations issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In
establishing such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that-
(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public..."
Id. § 103(b).
See also Masters, Congress Approves Funding Compromise, supra, at A17, col. 2 (dis-
cussing additional provisions of Appropriations Act of 1991 about NEA funding). As an effect
of the 1991 Appropriations bill, a grant recipient will no longer be required to sign a pledge
stating that the funds will not be used in support of obscene material. Id. The bill, however,
does allow the NEA to recoup money from a grant recipient whose creation of art is
subsequently judged to be obscene by a court's determination. Id.; see also infra notes 124-
28 and accompanying text (discussing additional provisions of approved fiscal 1991 funding
bill of NEA).
17. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing restrictive legislative lan-
guage proposed by members of Senate and House of Representatives).
18. See the Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(a) (setting forth Miller
language from which NEA derived its pledge requirement); see also infra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text (discussing NEA pledge requirement).
19. See Appropriations Act of 1991, supra note 15, § 103; See also Masters, Congress
Approves Funding Compromise, supra note 15, col. 2, at A17 (discussing approved fiscal year
1991 funding bill of NEA).
20. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing language of 1991 Appro-
priations Act as restrictive in creation of art and not compromise from 1990 legislation).
21. See infra notes 129-77 and accompanying text (discussing problems inherent in
indecency provision).
22. See infra notes 44-63, 77-111 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional prob-
lems that 1990 Appropriations bill presented).
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adopted bill for 1991 offers little relief to an artist. Instead, the language
in the 1991 Appropriations Act leaves the arts community with vague
expectations and may increase the chilling effect on the creation of art in
the United States than previously feared.Y
The public first feared a chilling effect on the arts community in October
1989 when, for the first time since the creation of the NEA,2 Congress
adopted legislation which included restrictions specifically prohibiting the
NEA from funding obscene works of art in the Appropriations Act of
1990.2 The language of the bill read:
23. See infra notes 136, 162-78 and accompanying text (discussing problems of vagueness
in definition of decency).
24. See Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at Part I (discussing history of
NEA). Congress created the NEA and the National Endowment for the Humanities through
Public Law 89-.209 in September 1965. Id. at 11 (citing 20 U.S.C. 951, § 2 (1965)) (stating
Congress's purpose in creating NEA, as National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
Act of 1965 Act). The Congressional Declaration of Purpose reads:
Sec. 2. The Congress hereby finds and declares-
(I) that the encouragement and support of national progress and scholarship
in the humanities and the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local
initiative, is also an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government;
(2) that a high civilization must not limit its efforts to science and technology
alone but must give full value and support to the other great branches of man's
scholarly and cultural activity;
(3) that democracy demands wisdom and vision in its citizens and that it must
therefore foster and support a form of education designed to make men masters of
their technology and not its unthinking servant;
(4) that it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to com-
plement, assist, and add to programs for the advancement of the humanities and
the arts by local, State, regional, and private agencies and their organizations;
(5) that the practice of art and the study of the humanities requires constant
dedication and devotion and that, while no government can call a great artist or
scholar into existence, it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government
to help create and sustain not only a climate encouraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry but also the material conditions facilitating the release of
this creative talent;
(6) that the world leadership which has come to the United States cannot rest
solely upon superior power, wealth, and technology, but must be solidly founded
upon worldwide respect and admiration for the Nation's high qualities as a leader
in the realm of ideas and of the spirit; and
(7) that, in order to implement these findings, it is desirable to establish a
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities and to strengthen the responsibil-
ities of the Office of Education with respect to education in the arts and the
humanities.
Id.
See also Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts: Free Expression and Political
Control, 103 HAgv. L. REv. 1969 (1990) [hereinafter Standards for Federal Funding of the
Arts] (discussing current standards for funding by NEA and suggesting those standards are
inappropriate; in Part I examining origins of NEA); see generally Note, The National Endow-
ment for the Arts: A Search for an Equitable Grantmaking Procedure, 74 GEO. L.J. 1521
(1986) [hereinafter A Search for An Equitable Grantmaking Procedure] (examining history of
government patronage of art in United States and discussing founding and grantmaking
procedures of NEA).
25. See Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(a) (stating content restrictions
for NEA funding).
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None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National
Endowment for the Arts... may be used to promote, disseminate,
or produce materials which in the judgment of the National En-
dowment for the Arts ... may be considered obscene, including
but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism,
the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex
acts and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value. 6
After Congress passed the Appropriation Act of 1990, the NEA required
grant recipients to sign an anti-obscenity pledge as a condition of acceptance
of government funds.27 By signing the pledge, the recipient certified com-
pliance with the terms and conditions of the grant.n Those terms included
the above-quoted language of the amendment to the 1990 Appropriations
Act .
29
Congress adopted the obscenity language of the 1990 appropriations
law from a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision, Miller v. California,0
which set forth the standard for determining obscenity that the Court
26. Id.
27. See National Endowment for the Arts, Statement of Policy and Guidance for the
Implementation of Section 304 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act of 1990, § 3(a) (July 5, 1990) [hereinafter Statement of Policy] (describing policy
guidelines of NEA about grant conditions). The NEA states in "Summary" portion of policy
text: "This statement of policy and accompanying guidance define what the Endowment
considers to be 'obscene' for purposes of carrying out the Endowment's responsibilities under
section 304 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990."
Id.
28. Id. Section 3(a) of the Appropriations Act of 1990 states: "Accordingly, grant
recipients, in order to receive funds, must agree that they will not use those grant funds to
promote, disseminate, or produce materials that are 'obscene' under the well-settled legal
definition employed by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California." Id.; see also Bargreen,
The Embattled Arts Agency, supra note 4 (discussing controversy over reauthorization of NEA
and NEA certification requirement of its recipients). The article states:
Grant recipients must sign a form that concludes with the following paragraph:
"I certify that I will comply with the terms and conditions of my grant as set forth
in the enclosed 'General Information and Guidance for Fellowship & Individual
Project Grant Recipients."'
Id.; supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing development of Miller test for
determining obscenity and interpretation of standard by Supreme Court since Miller).
29. See National Endowment for the Arts, Statement of Policy, supra note 27, § 3(a)
(describing policy guidelines of NEA regarding grant conditions). Section 3(a) states: "Para-
graph 2 of the general terms and conditions for organizations and individuals receiving grants
from the Endowment sets forth the restriction exactly as it appears in section 304 [of the 1990
appropriations law]." Id.
30. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at 53
(discussing NEA implementation of Miller test for obscenity standard). The language written
into the 1990 Appropriations Act intentionally borrowed the language of Miller v. California.
Id.; supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (stating that NEA grant recipients may not use
funds to "promote, disseminate, or produce" a work of art that is obscene under Miller
standard).
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continually has observed." According to the Supreme Court, to determine
if a work is obscene, a court must decide:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work; taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.1
2
Congressional authorization of the application of this standard to determine
the obscenity of a work of art, therefore, is consistent with judicial precedent
in judging a work to be obscene."
31. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 15. In Miller the defend-ant, Miller, sent unsolicited
sexually explicit books through the United States mail in violation of a California statute
prohibiting the knowing distribution of obscene material. Id. at 16. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of Miller based on the obscenity test formulated in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). Miller at 15. The Court adopted the
obscenity test applied in Memoirs with the following guidelines:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
Id. The Court replaced the Memoirs test, which required that a work be "utterly without
redeeming social value," with the new standard "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24-25. The majority of the Court
rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" standard for several reasons. Id. First,
the Court noted that no more than three justices ever have adhered to that standard. Id. at
25. Second, the Court questioned the meaning of such a standard, because it imposed "a
burden virtually impossible to discharge." Id. at 22. Various courts since the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Miller have sought to clarify the meaning of the three part
obscenity test for determining the "value" of a particular work.
The United States Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), further grappled
with the meaning of obscenity under the Miller standard. Id. at 498-99. In Pope, petitioners
were convicted of selling allegedly obscene magazines in an adult bookstore in Illinois. Id. at
499. The trial courts for each of petitioners' cases instructed the respective juries to consider
the 'value' of the magazines by applying contemporary community standards, while the Illinois
Appellate Court held that the standard is an objective one. Id. at 499-500. The Supreme Court
in Pope considered the appropriate standard for determining "value." Id. at 500-01. The
Court concluded that, while a community standard should be applied to the first and second
prongs of the Miller test, for determining prurient interests and patent offensiveness, the third
requirement for the value of the material must be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
person. Id. at 501. The Court based its conclusion on the rationale in Miller that "'[t]he First
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve
of the ideas these works represent."' Id. at 500.
32. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
33. This Note will not evaluate the appropriateness of the Miller standard in judging
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Although courts traditionally have applied the three-part standard, the
application of this standard in the form of a pledge requirement immediately
raised issues of unconstitutionality. 34 In Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v.
Frohnmaye3 s two arts organizations, the Bella Lewitsky Dance Foundation
(Foundation) and the Newport Harbor Art Museum (Museum), viewed the
pledge as a violation of freedom of expression and refused to sign the
pledge during the 1990-91 NEA application process.3 6 Following the NEA's
consequent refusal to award either the Foundation or the Museum any
funds because the organizations failed to sign the pledge requirement,3 7 the
Foundation and the Museum separately filed suits against the NEA and its
director, John Frohnmayer, and the court consolidated these actions.
38
In Bella Lewitsky, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California decided that both plaintiffs, the Foundation and the
Museum, suffered actual injury as a result of the withholding of the grants
obscenity in federally funded art works. However, commentators have evaluated the Miller
standard. See Post-Modern Art, supra note 2, at 1359 (exploring Miller test and concluding
inadequacy of Miller test for protecting contemporary art). The author writes:
... Miller was drafted at a radical turning point in the history of art, and the new
art that has arisen since Miller has rendered standards such as 'serious artistic value'
obsolete. This new art-Post-Modern art-rebels against the demand that a work of
art be serious, or that it have any traditional 'value' at all. Miller, then, evaluates
contemporary art by the very standard which that art seeks to defy.
Id.; see also Note, Standards For Federal Funding of the Arts, supra note 24 (discussing
current standards for funding by NEA and suggesting that those standards are inappropriate).
34. See infra notes 43-111 and accompanying text (discussing pledge requirement as being
vague, unconstitutional condition and prior restraint).
35. 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
36. Bella Lewitsky Dance Company v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal.
1991). The NEA awarded the Bella Lewitsky Dance Foundation a $72,000 grant. Id. at 776.
The NEA required the Foundation to return a certification of compliance with all NEA terms
and conditions, that included signing the pledge not to produce obscene materials. Id. at 776-
77. The Foundation returned the NEA certification but crossed out the obscenity pledge,
refusing to be bound by that condition. Id. at 777. The Board of Trustees of the Newport
Harbor Art Museum similarly refused to comply with the obscenity condition after the NEA
granted the Museum $100,000. Id.
37. Id. at 777. The NEA informed the Foundation that the terms and conditions of the
grant to the Foundation were not optional, and that compliance with the obscenity condition
was a prerequisite to receiving the grant. Id. The Foundation received only $15,000 of its
$72,000 grant, and the Museum did not receive any of its allocated $100,000 NEA funds. Id.
38. Id. at 775. See also Sherman, NEA Grant Provisos Attacked in Court, Nat. L. J.,
Nov. 5, 1990 at 12, col. 2 (discussing then pending litigation against NBA in response to
NEA's pledge requirement); Honan, U.S. Documents Said to Show Endowment Bowed to
Pressure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1991, at C13, col. 4 (reporting on case filed by four
performance artists against NEA). Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes and Tim Miller
haved filed an action in Federal District Court in Los Angeles, California against the NEA
and Frohnmayer, arguing that the NEA based its denial of grants to the artists on political,
rather than artistic grounds. Id. The artists now allege that government documents in the
possession of their attorneys support their allegations that the decision by Frohnmayer to deny
the grants demonstrates that Frohnmayer "yielded to political pressure." Id.
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by the NEA. 39 The Bella Lewitsky court noted that the NEA awarded grants
to both plaintiffs initially on the basis of artistic merit.40 The court found
that the NEA withheld the grants to the Foundation and to the Museum
solely because each refused to sign the anti-obscenity certificatioh. 41 Ac-
cordingly, the Bella Lewitsky court recognized that the Foundation and the
Museum suffered a loss of benefits because of the NEA's action.
42
In addition to concluding that plaintiffs suffered a loss of monetary
benefits because of the pledge requirement, the Bella Lewitsky court ex-
amined the constitutional effects that the NEA pledge requirement had on
the Foundation and on the Museum.43 The Bella Lewitsky court initially
addressed plaintiffs' contention that the pledge requirement was unconsti-
tutionally vague because the Foundation and the Museum had to speculate
about how the NEA would judge obscenity. 4' The court rejected, for two
reasons, the NEA's argument that the NEA's reliance on the Miller standard
for obscenity solved the vagueness issue. 45 First, the Bella Lewitsky court
found that the NEA policies which dictate reliance on the Miller standard
for defining obscenity were not binding on the NEA. 46 Second, the Bella
Lewitsky court stated that the NEA is unable to provide to its grant
recipients the proper procedural safeguards.47 The Bella Lewitsky court held
that the NEA pledge requirement was unconstitutionally vague because it
39. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 778-79. The Bella Lewitsky court concluded that
because plaintiffs had suffered actual injury, plaintiffs had standing to sue. Id. at 780.
40. Id. at 778.
41. Id. at 779.
42. Id. at 778-80. The Bella Lewitsky court stated that defendants' withholding of the
grant money from plaintiffs is a direct result of plaintiff's refusal to sign the anti-obscenity
certification. Id. at 779.
43. See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text (discussing Bella Lewitsky court's
analysis of First and Fifth Amendment issues raised by NEA pledge requirement).
44. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 781. The Bella Lowitsky Court cited Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), in which the Ninth Circuit defined the vagueness
doctrine as "a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined." 754 F. Supp. at 781. The Bella Lewitsky court adopted
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Grayned, that an individual must be able to know exactly
what is being prohibited; otherwise, an individual will avoid the "unlawful zone" and the
vagueness consequentially will inhibit the exercise of constitutional freedoms. Id.
45. Id. at 781-82. The NEA responded that the Miller standard was not vague as a
matter of law. Id. at 781; see also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing Miller
standard and NEA implementation of standard in pledge requirement).
46. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 782. (citing Telecommunications Research and Action
Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1988), which held that general statement of
policy is just agency informing public of policy that agency intends to implement in future
rulemaking or adjudications).
47. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 782. The Bella Lewitsky court specifically refers to
the procedural safeguards discussed in Miller. Id. The Supreme Court in Miller outlined the
safeguards as including first, a statute clearly defining the prohibited conduct; second, a full
adversarial trial; and third, a citizen jury to apply local community standards, the third prong
of the Miller test for obscenity. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-35 (1973)).
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violated the Fifth Amendment in allowing the NEA, and not the court, to
make the obscenity determination."
The Bella Lewitsky court further held that the vague language of the
NEA pledge requirement violated not only plaintiffs' right to due process,
but also plaintiffs' First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.4 9 The
court recognized that the vagueness in the obscenity certification created a
chilling effect on a grant recipient's artistic expression. 0 A chilling effect
occurs when a vague oath or certification causes individuals to restrict their
actions to safe conduct to avoid a threatened sanction .5 The Bella Lewitsky
plaintiffs contended that the pledge requirement chills creativity in the art
process because NEA applicants would avoid creating certain legitimate
works of art in fear of violating the obscenity pledge, or in fear of litigation
with the NEA as the result of a possible obscenity violation . 2 The court
concluded that, in this instance, the creative expression of the Foundation
suffered as a result of the pledge requirement.53 The court also asserted that
the Museum would impose self-censorship in making exhibition selections
to avoid showing obscene works of art.5 4 The Bella Lewitsky court noted
that the chilling effect becomes "exacerbated by the practical realities of
funding in the artistic community." 5  Because the NEA plays a significant
role in the funding of the arts in the United States, NEA grantmaking
decisions influence non-federal funding sources. 56 Any chilling effect caused
by the NEA could therefore have a multiple effect on financial sources that
are available to artists and arts organizations outside the NEA.5 7
The plaintiffs in Bella Lewitsky challenged the inherent vagueness in
the NEA's implementation of the government's anti-obscenity subsidy re-
striction in the form of the pledge requirement, but did not challenge the
right of the government to restrict NEA funds. However, the Independent
Commission, which Congress created in response to controversy over the
NEA's funding standards, 59 addressed the issue of the government's right
48. Id. at 782. See also infra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (analyzing argument
that pledge requirement in absence of judicial determination of obscenity is unconstitutional
prior restraint of artist's right to expression).
49. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 783.
50. Id. at 782-83.
51. Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 372 (1964)).
52. Id. at 782 (citing Amicus Brief of Rockefeller Foundation amicus brief at 12, 54);
See also Testimony of the Legal Task Force, Statement of Kathleen Sullivan, A Report to
Congress on the National Endowment for the Arts, at 7-8 (July 1990) [hereinafter Testimony
of the Legal Task Force] (stating chilling effect will result because artists will avoid creating
innovative art for fear that art may come close to obscenity).
53. Bella Lewitsky, 754 F.Supp. at 783.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Amicus Brief of Theatre Communications Group (no page cite)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 784.
59. See Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(c). Congress temporarily
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to impose conditions on benefits it offers for the exercise of a constitutional
right.60 The Independent Commission unanimously adopted a consensus
statement of the legal issues6' identified by a legal task force of six lawyers. 62
established the Independent Commission for the purposes of:
(A) Reviewing the National Endowment for the Arts grant making procedures,
including those of its panel system; and
(B) considering whether the standard for publicly funded art should be different
than the standard for privately funded art.
Id. § 304(c)(I).
The Independent Commission is a twelve member group comprised of four members
appointed by the President of the United States, four members appointed by the President
upon recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and four members
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the President pro tempore of the
Senate. Id. § 304 (c)(2).
60. See Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at 85 (exploring whether standard
for publicly funded art should be different than standard for privately funded art and endorsing
statement of legal task force that addressed conditions of government funding); See also infra
notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing analysis of NEA obscenity restrictions as
unconstitutional governmental condition on funding of artists).
61. Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at 85. The Consensus Statement
states:
1. There is no constitutional obligation on the part of the federal government to
fund the arts. That is a policy decision to be determined by Congress based upon
its views as to whether it is useful and wise for the federal government to play a
role in the arts funding process. The Constitution offers no guidance as to whether
the arts should be funded by the federal government.
2. If federal funds are used to subsidize the arts, however, constitutional limitations
on how the arts are funded may come into play. The most important of these is
that while Congress has broad powers as to how to spend public funds, it may not
do so in a way that the Supreme Court has said is "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas." Congress plainly may, for example, determine to spend all federal
funds designated for the arts on music and none on the visual arts. Or vice versa.
It may expend funds to celebrate American history or American diversity, even
though spending for one purpose naturally means less money is expended on others.
And, of course, it may insist on artistic excellence as a prerequisite for any funding.
What it may not do, however, is to choose those.to be funded-and, often more
important, those not to be funded-in a manner which punishes what Congress
views as "dangerous content." When funding denials are the product of invidious
discrimination with the aim of suppressing a particular message and for no other
reason, a particularly powerful case might be made that the decision was unconsti-
tutional.
3. Obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment and Congress is
under no obligation to fund obscene speech. In fact, under both state and federal
laws, obscenity is a crime. The definition of what is and is not obscene was set
forth by the Supreme Court in the 1973 case of Miller v. California...
4. Unless a work fits within each of the prongs of the definition [in Miller], it is
not obscene under the Miller standard. For example, any work which, "taken as a
whole," has "serious ... artistic ... value" cannot be obscene under Miller,
whatever its sexual content.
5. The NEA currently requires all grant recipients to certify, under oath, that they
will adhere to and enforce a ban on any use of NEA funds for purposes which the
NEA "may consider" to be obscene. Some of the legal advisors to the Independent
Commission believe this requirement is unconstitutional; all believe the insistence on
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Specifically, the Independent Commission recognized that, while the Con-
stitution does not require the government to fund the arts in the United
States, if the government chooses to fund the arts, constitutional limitations
apply to that funding.63
Before commenting on the constitutional limitations on funding, the
Independent Commission recognized the rights of an artist to create obscene
subject matter." While the First Amendment guarantee of free speech applies
to artistic expression, 6 the government does not confer a right of subsidy
to any artist in the United States."6 Additionally, an artist does not have a
constitutional right to produce an obscene work of art.Y In Roth v. United
States" the United States Supreme Court recognized that the First Amend-
ment does not protect the creation of obscene material. 9 In Roth, the
defendant mailed obscene circulars and advertising in violation of a federal
obscenity statute that prohibited the mailing of obscene material.70 The
Court considered whether the federal obscenity statute violated the Firit
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
7 1
The Court examined the history of the First Amendment and its guarantee
of freedom of expression and concluded that obscenity was outside the
protection intended for speech and for the press.72 The Court regarded the
such a requirement is unwise and all recommend against it.
Id. at 85-87.
62. Id. (discussing formation of Independent Commission Legal Task Force). The lawyers
that comprised the legal task force included: Floyd Abrams of Cahill, Gordon and Reindel;
Michael McConnell, professor of law at the University of Chicago; Henry Monaghan, professor
of law at Columbia University; Theodore Olson of Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School; and Kathleen Sullivan, professor of
law at Harvard University. Id.
63. See id. (setting out Legal Task Force Consensus Statement and discussing constitu-
tional issues raised by 1990 Appropriations Act).
64. See id. at 83-85 (recognizing that obscenity is not protected speech); See infra notes
65-73 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of obscenity and creation of obscene
art).
65. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Theodore
Olson, at 4 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975),
which held that live drama as medium of expression is protected speech under First Amendment
and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973)). The United States Supreme Court in
Miller extended First Amendment protection to works that, "taken as a whole, have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a
majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent." Miller, 413 U.S. at 34.
66. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that individuals do not have
constitutional right to government benefits); See also infra note 77 and accompanying text
(discussing facts of Perry and principle that government may not deny benefit to person on
basis that violates constitutional interests such as freedom of expression).
67. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing obscene expression as not
constitutionally protected).
68. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
69. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
70. Id. at 480.
71. Id. at 479.
72. Id. at 483. The Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the First Amend-
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First Amendment as protecting ideas of redeeming social importance, .and
recognized obscenity, implicitly in the history of the First Amendment, as
"utterly without redeeming social importance." 71
Although Roth held that an artist does not have a constitutional right
to create obscene art, an artist does retain certain rights of expression which
the government may not violate by withholding funding.7 4 Advocates of the
pledge requirement assert that, because an artist does not have a constitu-
tional right to receive federal funding for creation of an artist's work, the
government may place restrictions on the type of art that the government
desires to fund. 75 This view is consistent with the Appropriations Act of
ment, stating:
"the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance ... at the time
of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed
as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that ob-
scenity, too, was outside the protection intended for speech and press."
Id. (citing Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, Section 69 (1821), Stat. Laws of Conn.
109 (1824); Knowles v. State, 3 Day (Conn.) 103 (1808); Rev. Stat. of 1835, c. 130, Section
10, Rev. Stat. of Mass. 740 (1836); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335 (1821); Rev.
Stat. of 1842, c. 113, Section 2; Rev. Stat. of N.H. 221 (1843); Act for Suppressing Vice and
Immorality, Section XII (1798), N.J. Rev. Laws 329, 331 (1800); Commonwealth v. Sharpless,
2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815); See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)
(holding that exhibition of obscene material in public places is not constitutionally protected).
In Paris Adult Theatre I, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in
Roth. Id. at 54. Respondents brought suit against the theater to enjoin the exhibition of two
films that the respondents considered obscene. Id. Tie Court remanded the case for a
consideration of Georgia obscenity laws in light of the First Amendment obscenity standards
then recently formulated by the Court in Miller. Id. at 50. The Court in Paris Adult Theatre
I affirmed that obscene material is not protected under the First Amendment as free speech.
Id. at 54, citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-25 (1973) and Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (1957). But see
Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 70 (Douglas, J. dissenting):
Art and literature reflect tastes; and tastes, like musical appreciation, are hardly
reducible to precise definitions. That is one reason I have always felt that 'obscenity'
was not an exception to the First Amendment. For matters of taste, like matters of
belief, turn on the idiosyncrasies of individuals. They are too personal to define and
too emotional and vague to apply....
Id.
73. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. The United States Supreme Court in Roth subsequently noted
that the Court similarly had expressed the principle that obscenity is regarded as without value
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), in which the Court acknowl-
edged that obscene utterances:
... are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
74. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutional limitations on
awarding and withholding government benefits in context of arts funding).
75. See Bernstein, Subsidies for Artists: Is Denying a Grant Really Censorship?, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1990, at ClI, col. 6 (discussing whether NEA's pledge requirement is censorship
or whether artists have grown accustomed to grants as entitlement). With regard to assertions
by opponents of the NEA anti-obscenity pledge that the pledge requirement is censorship,
Bernstein comments that some members of the public adhere to the view that nothing is
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1990, in which Congress restricted funding of obscene art, including images
that are sadomasochistic, homo-erotic and sexually exploitative of children.
7 6
The advocates of the pledge requirement, however, fail to recognize that
although an individual has no right to a government benefit or subsidy,
once the government grants the benefit, the government cannot deny the
benefit on any basis that adversely impacts the individual's freedom of
speech."
preventing artists from performing whatever they want to perform, so long as the performance
is not paid for by the taxpayers. Id.; Helms, Tax-Paid Obscenity, supra note 10 (arguing
Congress has power to decide whether to fund art that is offensive to public); Fein, Regarding
Reauthorizing the National Endowment for the Arts: Statement Before the Senate Subcommittee
on Education, Arts, and Humanities, 14 NovA L.J. 333 (1990) (stating that government has
right to enforce denial of subsidies by NEA, particularly from funding indecent art).
76. See Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(a) (setting forth specific content
restrictions for NEA funded art).
77. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In Perry, appellant was a college
professor who brought an action against the college of his employment, alleging that the
college's decision not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of the school administration
and thus was a violation of his right to free speech. Id. at 593. The United States Supreme
Court reasoned that a teacher's exercise of free speech cannot be the basis for a denial of a
renewal of a public school teacher's contract. Id. at 598. The Court determined that while an
individual has no right to a government benefit, once the government offers the benefit, the
government cannot deny the benefit on any basis that infringes upon a constitutionally protected
interest, particularly speech, because "such interference with constitutional rights is impermis-
sible." Id. at 597. Other cases have applied this principle with respect to government benefits
such as denials of tax exemptions, unemployment benefits, welfare payments and public
employment. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (holding that filing of
loyalty oath as prerequisite of obtaining veterans' tax exemption violated free speech); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that disqualification of individual for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits because of individual's refusal to accept employment on day
contrary to religious belief imposes unconstitutional burden on individual's free exercise of
religion); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (holding that statute that prohibits
benefits to resident aliens of less than one year violates Equal Protection Clause); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (same); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952)
(holding that condition requiring state employee to take loyalty oath as prerequisite to
employment is unconstitutional); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960) (holding that
condition compelling teacher to disclose association ties as prerequisite to public employment
is unconstitutional); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (holding that oath in belief
of God as prerequisite for qualification for public office is unconstitutional); Cramp v. Board
of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961) (holding that loyalty oath requirement of
Florida public school teaching position is unconstitutional); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,
18-19 (1966) (holding that loyalty oath of Maryland public school teaching position is uncon-
stitutional); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (holding that loyalty
oath requirement of Arizona public school teaching position is unconstitutional); Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that teachers' right to make public
comment may not be basis of dismissal from public employment).
In Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991), the
United States District Court for the Central District of California characterized the government's
imposition of obscenity restrictions on NEA grant recipients as an unconstitutional condition
on freedom of speech. Bella Lowitsky, 754 F. Supp. at 784-85. The court stated that obscenity
restrictions impinge on freedom of speech as prohibited in Perry, because the restrictions'
vagueness violates the First and Fifth Amendments. Id.; see supra notes 44-58 (discussing Bella
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The pledge requirement, by broadly prohibiting art protected under
Miller,78 is a denial of a benefit that adversely affects an artist's constitu-
tional rights. When Congress drafted the Appropriations Act of 1990,
Congress added to the Miller test a list of "forbidden topics,"179 including
depictions of sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, or individuals engaged in sex
actsY° The government, unlike a private art patron, is not at liberty to
exercise its "unfettered taste or whim" merely because the government
spends public funds on the art."' The government, by making federal funds
available to artists through the NEA, may not deny that funding to any
artist in a manner that infringes on an artist's or recipient's right to freedom
of expression or due process.
8 2
One First Amendment limitation on Congressional denial of funding is
that Congress cannot act in a manner that aims to suppress dangerous
ideas.8 3 Congress may not make an unjustified viewpoint discrimination in
Lewitsky court's rationale that pledge requirement is vague in violation of Fifth Amendment
and that vagueness causes chilling effect in violation of First Amendment).
78. See supra notes 31-32 (discussing Miller test for determining obscenity).
79. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Floyd Abrams,
at 2-3 (analyzing constitutional issues raised by NEA pledge requirement). Mr. Abrams stated
that:
"What Congress may not constitutionally do, however, is to create a list of
presumptively forbidden topics, speech that is constitutionally protected but which
Congress disapproves of and, on this ground having nothing to do with artistic
excellence, to decline to fund them... . to say that the arts will be funded but that
no art which is 'homoerotic' (Michelangelo's 'David,' perhaps?) will be funded is
constitutionally unacceptable."
Id.
80. See Appropriations Act of 1990, supra note 4, § 304(a) (setting out specific content
restrictions for NEA art funding).
81. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Kathleen M.
Sullivan, at 2 (discussing restrictions government may place on benefits it makes available).
Sullivan states that "Free speech principles will limit the kinds of discrimination the federal
government may make about art that is publicly funded. A public art endowment is constrained
by the Constitution in ways that a private artist or art collector is not." Id.
82. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional limitations
to government benefits in context of arts funding).
83. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
(holding that Congress did not violate defendant's First Amendment rights in deciding not to
subsidize defendant's activity, because Congress' decision was not intended to discriminate
invidiously or to suppress dangerous ideas). In Regan, Taxation Without Representation of
Washington ("TWR"), a lobbying organization, brought an action against the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States alleging that the
Internal Revenue Service's denial of TWR's application for tax exempt status was a violation
of TWR's First Amendment rights. Id. The United States Supreme Court considered whether
Congress violated TWR's rights by Congress' decision to deny subsidy of TWR's lobbying
activities. Id. In holding that Congress did not violate TWR's First Amendment rights, the
Court stated that "the case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in
its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Id. at 548.
See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (holding unconstitutional swearing of
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its decision whether to extend funding to an individual or to an organization
in any benefit that the government offers.8 Because the government offers
public funds to artists, the government cannot refuse to fund an artist
because of the viewpoint expressed in the work of art or because the work
is offensive to the public.85 Additionally, the government may not impose
any condition on the artist prior to funding. 6 The government, therefore,
oath as precondition of obtaining tax exemption).
In Speiser, the state of California denied appellant veterans' tax exemptions provided for
by the state constitution. Id. at 515. Appellants failed to swear, as a prerequisite to obtaining
the benefit, "that they [did] not advocate the overthrow of the Federal or State Government
by force, violence or other unlawful means, or advocate the support of a foreign government
against the United States in event of hostilities." Id. at 513. The United States Supreme Court
held that the statutory procedure violated due process requirements because the state did not
provide procedural safeguards in placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer. Id. at 513-14.
The Court stated that the state must prove that the appellants engaged in criminal speech. Id.
Appellants in Speiser argued that the Constitution prohibited the swearing of an oath as a
condition of obtaining a tax exemption. Id. The Court agreed that the denial of the benefit
would cause appellants to refrain from the speech. Id. at 519. The Court stated that such a
denial is "frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas." Id.
84. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Henry P.
Monaghan, at 3 (discussing whether constitutional standard for publicly'funded art should be
different than standard for privately funded art). Henry P. Monaghan, Harlan Fiske Stone
Professor at Columbia Law School, comments that while Congress has a wide discretion in
excluding some viewpoints in its attempt to seek public support, Congressional efforts to
suppress unpopular ideas and offensive speech have failed. Id. at 4. As support, Monaghan
cited the decision in United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 2404 (1990), in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of flag burning. Id. Monaghan also
suggests that the principle in Regan, 461 U.S. 540, 548, forbidding unjustified viewpoint
discrimination, is applicable to all benefits offered by the government. Testimony of the Legal
Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Henry P. Monaghan, at 3.
85. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional protection of
offensive speech).
86. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Theodore
Olson, at 16 (discussing implications of conditions on government funding). Olson, an attorney
at Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, characterized the government's imposition of a condition on
an artist prior to funding as a broad application of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine."
Id. Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a state cannot grant a privilege subject to
conditions that cause the waiver of constitutional rights. Id. Olson quoted from the statement
of Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts and
Humanities, given on April 27, 1990. Id. Professor Sullivan asserted that "[Flunding may not
be withheld because of the unorthodoxy or unpopularity of the artist's message." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed protections of offensive and outrageous
speech. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Supreme Court gave "out-
rageous" expression First Amendment protection. Id. at 55. In Hustler Magazine, respondent
brought an action against Hustler for a parody advertisement that portrayed respondent as
"having engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse." Id. at
46. The Court upheld the constitutional protection of outrageous ideas, stating:
mhe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that conse-
quence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet
of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace
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should not be able to prohibit "forbidden topics" in the language of the
Appropriations Act simply because Congress may disagree with the views
and speech expressed in art that contains such topics.Y
The legislative language of the 1990 bill, however, appears to be a list
of forbidden topics. 8a In previous NEA grantmaking procedures, Congress
vested in the arts professionals at the NEA the discretion to apply aesthetic
judgment in deciding whether to fund a work on the basis of the artistic
value of that work.8 9 The NEA may allocate grants for a particular subject
matter, such as performance art, without infringing the First Amendment
rights of any recipient. 9° However, the government may not apply its
particular views on race, politics, religion or sex in the suppression of art
in its funding programs. 91 The NEA restriction requiring an artist to sign
of ideas.
Id. at 55 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-746 (1978)). See also Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that offensive speech expressed by words on jacket
in public place is constitutionally protected speech).
In Cohen, appellant Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16.
Police arrested under a California law that prohibited "behavior which has a tendency to
provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." Id. The Court found that
the state had provided no evidence that such violent conduct would result. Id. at 18. Instead,
the Court upheld the expression as having value necessary in the public debate, which the
First Amendment protects. Id. at 24. The Court sought to avoid suppression of offensive
speech as a guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. Id. at 26.
87. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing language of 1990 Appro-
priations Act as viewpoint discrimination against artists).
88. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing unconstitutionality of lan-
guage of 1990 Appropriations Act by listing forbidden topics).
89. 20 U.S.C. § 954(5)(c)(1) (1982). The standards that guide the NEA in its grantmaking
procedures state that the Chairman of the NEA is authorized to support:
(1) productions which have substantial and cultural significance, giving emphasis
to American creativity and the maintenance and encouragement of professional
excellence;
(2) productions, meeting professional standards of authenticity, irrespective of origin
which are of significant merit and which, without such assistance, would otherwise
be unavailable to our citizens in many areas of the country;
(3) projects that will encourage and assist artists and enable them to achieve
standards of professional excellence;
(4) workshops that will encourage and develop the appreciation and enjoyment of
the arts by our citizens;
(5) other relevant projects, including surveys, research and planning in the arts.
Id. See also Note, A Search for an Equitable Grant Making Process, supra note 24 (examining
history of government patronage of art in United States and discussing founding and grant-
making procedures of NEA).
90. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Michael W.
McConnell, at 5 (discussing distinction between content discrimination, subject matter discrim-
ination and viewpoint discrimination in federal funding of benefits); Testimony of the Legal
Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Kathleen M. Sullivan, at 7 (same). McConnell and
Sullivan assert that the NEA's employment of subject matter discrimination in certain decisions,
such as a decision to fund tragic theater but not comedy, does not raise constitutional
problems. Statement of McConnell at 5; Statement of Sullivan at 7.
91. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Kathleen M.
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an anti-obscenity pledge that the artist will not create art which is sado-
masochistic, homo-erotic, or which involves individuals engaged in sexual
acts, before creating the art, is an example of the government's impermissible
application of its particular views against art that the government believes
is morally offensive. 92
An additional problem of the 1990 Appropriations Act is the require-
ment that a grant recipient, before receiving federal funding from the NEA,
must sign a legal document of a contractual nature.93 In this document the
recipient or artist promises not to create a work of art that would be
determined "obscene" according to the NEA's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's Miller test.94 Consequently, this pledge could create a prior restraint
on an artist's right to expression by suppressing, or restraining, an artist's
work prior to the artist actually creating the work.
Sullivan, at 5 (commenting on government discrimination in offering benefits); Testimony of
the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Michael W. McConnell, at 9-10 (same).
Sullivan calls government discrimination in government subsidies a "cardinal sin," and com-
ments that the government cannot withhold funding for viewpoint discrimination any more
than the government may criminalize unorthodox or unpopular views. Statement of Sullivan
at 5. Sullivan also states that the United States Supreme Court has refused to uphold criminal
laws that suppress sexually explicit expression on the basis of the government's viewpoint. Id.
(citing Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) and Hudnut v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).
In Kingsley, appellant submitted the film "Lady Chatterly's Lover" to the Motion Pictures
Division of the New York Education Department in order to obtain a license. 360 U.S. at
685. The Division denied Kingsley a license, finding that the depiction of adultery in the film
was immoral and in violation of the licensing statute which explicitly prohibited obscenity,
indecency and immorality. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute violated
appellant's freedom to advocate ideas, which was guaranteed by the First Amendment. Id. at
688. The Court rejected the argument that the portrayal of adultery was contrary to the moral
standards of the citizens, writing "[The Constitution]'s guarantee is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority." Id. at 689. In Hudnut,
the United States Supreme Court considered an Indianapolis ordinance that defined pornog-
raphy in terms of material that presented women as sexual objects or in positions of sexual
subordination. 475 U.S. at 1101. The Court found the statute to be unconstitutional because
the statute restricted speech based on content alone. Id.
See also Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HA~v. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (exploring
complexities of government funding and conditions on funding); Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN Dic, o L. Rnv. 327 (1989) (discussing three
theories of unconstitutional conditions doctrine and application of theories to abortion cases).
92. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 65, Statement of Henry P.
Monaghan, at 8 (commenting that government exclusion of funds for art that is indecent or
contains offensive sexual features is not valid). Monaghan states that government exclusions
of funding for art based on the art's sexual features is not viewpoint neutral, particularly in
comparison with a government restriction that requires an artist to employ a specific method
or medium to express the artist's message. Id. Monaghan concludes that "Any such claim
would wholly misapprehend the relationship between form and art and would also invite
considerable viewpoint restriction." Id.
93. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing NEA pledge requirement
and procedures recipient must follow).
94. See supra notes 27-32 (discussing adoption by NEA of Miller test as standard for
judging obscenity in work of art created by recipient).
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The United States Supreme Court regards prior restraints on freedom
of expression as presumptively unconstitutional. 95 However, courts have
allowed prior restraints as a means of screening obscene material after the
production of the material and prior to actual public sale or exhibition.9
Prior restraint in the absence of a judicial procedure results in censorshipY
The United States Supreme Court faced the issue of censorship in South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.98 In Southeastern Promotions a city's
municipal board denied the presentation of "Hair" at the town theater
because the board determined that the production of the musical, due to
its content, would not be in the best interest of the community.9 The Court
considered the constitutionality of the procedure which the board followed
in denying the presentation of the performance.' °° The Court recognized
that a heavy presumption exists against prior restraints,101 and concluded
that the board's decision was an unconstitutional prior restraint because the
board failed to implement the proper procedural safeguards, which required
a judicial determination in an adversarial proceeding.e 2 The Court recog-
nized that the proper procedural safeguards place the burden on the censor
to prove that the Constitution does not protect the material. 03
Similarly, in Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank' °4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the necessity of procedural
95. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931) (holding that prior restraints on
publication are inconsistent with freedom of expression). In Near, a local prosecutor sought
to prohibit, consistent with Minnesota state law, publication of a newspaper, alleging that the
newspaper was a nuisance after it made accusations against public officials. Id. at 703. The
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute in
question and held that in order to be consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of the press, the Court would not permit prior restraints against publication except in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the nation is at war. Id. at 716. See also New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (holding that First Amendment protects
press from judicial restraints prior to publication).
96. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J. concurring that prior restraints
are not tolerated except in time of war because of national interest, noting obscenity cases not
on point). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan characterized obscene material as being
constitutionally protected from prior restraints, because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Roth v. United States that First Amendment freedom of speech protections do not extend to
obscenity. Id.; See also Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961) (upholding
constitutionality of state legislation that required judicial prescreening clearance procedure
before film industry distributed motion picture); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 445 (1957) (upholding decision of judge in equity to order ex parte injunction and trial
before sale and distribution of literary work that might be considered obscene).
97. See Near, 283 U.S. at 712-14 (holding that statute suppressing "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory" newspapers or periodicals both enjoins publication as prior restraint and
causes publisher to act as censor).
98. 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
99. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 549 (1975).
100. Id. at 552-53.
101. Id. at 566.
102. Id. at 559.
103. Id. at 560.
104. 745 F.2d 560 (1984).
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safeguards when the Ninth Circuit rejected the Burbank City Council's
denial of certain musical entertainers' access to perform. 05 The Ninth Circuit
in Cinevision considered the constitutionality of the procedure that the
council employed. 1°6 The council members objected to the performances on
the assumption that the music would attract a "drug crowd" to the city.'
7
The Ninth Circuit found that such assumptions were arbitrary and unlawful
and deprived the performers of a judicial determination of whether the
performance material was constitutionally protected.les
The prior restraints in Southeastern Promotions and Cinevision are
distinguishable from the restrictions contained in the NEA pledge require-
ment because the pledge requirement restrains the artist prior to the creation
of the work.' °9 Because of the pledge requirement, an artist does not have
the complete freedom to create a work of art that expresses the content of
the artist's choice. The created work is not subjected, then, to the procedural
safeguards articulated in Southeastern Promotions and Cinevision."0 A prior
restraint on an exhibition or sale of a work of art is permissible only after
a judicial determination that the work of art in question is obscene."'
Recognizing the questions of constitutionality surrounding the NEA
restrictions and the possibility that the restrictions may have a dangerous
chilling effect, the Independent Commission responded unfavorably both to
the imposition of specific restrictions on the content of NEA-funded art
and to the NEA-imposed certification that requires recipients to pledge that
they will not create obscene art." 2 The Independent Commission recom-
mended that Congress remove any content restrictions on federally funded
art and rescind the pledge because of the constitutional issues raised by the
provisions of the pledge." 3 Beginning in June 1990, members of Congress
105. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 573 (1984).
106. Id. at 566.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 576.
109. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (concluding that pledge requirement
is impermissible prior restraint on artists).
110. See supra notes 66-76 (referring to procedural safeguards of Southeastern Promotions,
420 U.S. 546, and Cinevision Corp., 745 F.2d 560).
111. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discussing judicial safeguards nec-
essary for imposition of prior restraints).
112. See Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at 55-81 (discussing recommen-
dations on "whether the Standard for Publicly Funded Art Should be Different Than the
Standard for Privately Funded Art" and on issue of "Obscenity and Other Content Restric-
tions," recommending that standard must go beyond that for privately funded art and that
restrictions on content of funded art should be abandoned in favor of standard of artistic
excellence).
113. Id. at 83-91. For additional exploration of the constitutional issues raised by the
Appropriations Act of 1990, see Note, Standards for Federal Funding of the Arts, supra note
24 (discussing current standards for NEA funding and suggesting that those standards are
inappropriate); Rohde, Art of the State: Congressional Censorship of the National Endowment
for the Arts, 12 HAST. Comm. & Etrr. L.J. 353 (1990) (examining constitutionality of Helms
Amendment and resulting threat to NEA's existence); Fox, Art Funding: The Fight over Sex,
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proposed various bills regarding the reauthorization of the NEA.114 These
bills included various proposals for reauthorization in response to outrage
in the arts and public communities, as well as in the federal government,
over the 1990 Appropriations Act.115 In October 1990 the House of Rep-
resentatives defeated two Congressional proposals.1 6 One proposal sought
to place specific content restrictions on the NEA,11 7 and the other proposal
attempted to prohibit the reauthorization of the NEA altogether."'
The House of Representatives approved, however, a compromise bill to
reauthorize the NEA for three years.119 The House-approved bill eliminated
Money and Power, 14 NovA L.J. 369 (1990) (arguing that NEA was created to fund art
without Congressional interference); Jacobs, "One if by Land, Two if by Sea", 14 NovA L.J.
343 (1990) (concluding that current legislative restrictions pose threat to creativity of arts in
United States).
114. See Parachini, White House Plea on NEA Resisted; Showdown Next?, L.A. Times,
June 7, 1990, at Fl, col. 5 (discussing questioned future and reauthorization of NEA); Masters,
Frohnmayer Welcomes Senate NEA Bill, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WPOST File (discussing Senate bill regarding reauthorization of NEA); infra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text (discussing proposed bills regarding reauthorization of
NEA).
115. See Berke, House Approves Compromise Bill to Continue the Arts Endowment,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (discussing proposals for reauthorization of NEA
and final House of Representatives' version of bill that would reauthorize NEA and require
judicial determination of obscenity).
116. Id. at C3, col. 1; infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (describing other
Congressional proposals defeated by House of Representatives).
117. See Berke, House Approves Compromise Bill to Continue Arts Endowment, supra
note 115, at C3, col. 2. California Representative Dana Rohrabacher introduced the alternative
bill to restrict federal funding of art projects involving subjects such as child pornography
and the desecration of the flag. Id.; Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-House Approves Compro-
mise on Arts Endowment Bill, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Oct. 13, 1990 at 3423. The
Rohrabacher amendment also prohibited funding of projects that are "obscene; that denigrate
the beliefs, tenets or objects of a particular religion; or that denigrate a person or group on
the basis of race, sex, handicap or national origin." Id.; Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-
Compromise Eludes Members on Standards for Arts, CONGRESSIONAL QUATEm Y, July 28,
1990, at 2422 (discussing HR 4825 bill to reauthorize NEA for five years and discussing
language of proposed legislation). Jamie L. Witten, Mississippi Representative, submitted to
Representative Yates an amendment to the Education and Labor Committee's restriction-free
bill that requested a prohibition on funding "filthy pictures." Id. Paul B. Henry, Michigan
Representative, sought to prohibit funding of works of art that 'deliberately denigrate' the
cultural heritage of the United States, its religious traditions, or racial or ethnic groups," and
material that is obscene by Supreme Court standards or indecent under the Federal Commu-
nications Commission's (FCC) definition of that term. Id.
118. See Berke, House Approves Compromise Bill to Continue Arts Endowment, supra
note 115, at C3, col. 3. Representative Philip M. Crane proposed the bill to abolish the NEA.
Id.; Andrews, House Says No to Anti-Obscenity Limits on NEA Funding, Duke Chron., Oct.
12, 1990, at 7, col. I (discussing decision by House to eliminate existing anti-obscenity restrictions
and to allow courts to determine obscenity). Representative Crane wanted to abolish the NEA
because of the NEA's prior support for art that he deemed 'obnoxious, perverted and sick."'
Id. at 7, col. 4.
119. See Andrews, House Says No to Anti-Obscenity Limits on NEA Funding, supra note
118, at 7, col. 1 (discussing provisions of House bill regarding NEA funding restrictions). The
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the content restrictions that the 1990 Appropriations Act placed on the
NEA.' ° In place of the content restrictions, the House bill delegated to the
courts the responsibility for determining obscenity. 12' Furthermore, the com-
promise bill required a grant recipient to return federal funds upon a judicial
determination that the recipient violated obscenity standards in the reci-
pient's use of the funds.'2 The Senate also considered a bill almost identical
to the House-adopted bill that would have reauthorized the NEA without
content restrictions and would have allowed the courts to make judgments
of obscenity.'2
On October 28, 1990 the Senate and House of Representatives finally
came to an agreement, approving legislation that reauthorized the NEA for
three years.' u Congress parades the law as a compromise because of its
terms.12 The law contains no explicit restrictions on the content of NEA-
adopted bill is a bipartisan "compromise" proposed by Pat Williams, Democratic representative
from Montana, and Thomas Coleman, Republican representative from Missouri. Id.; Zuckman,
Obscenity Debate-House Approves Compromise on Arts Endowment Bill, supra note 117, at
3423 (discussing provisions of House-approved bill as William-Cole compromise).
120. See Andrews, House Says No to Anti-Obscenity Limits on NEA Funding, supra note
118, at 7, col. 1. (discussing decision by House to eliminate existing anti-obscenity restrictions
and to allow courts to determine obscenity); Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-House Approves
Compromise in Arts Endowment Bill, supra note 117, at 3423 (discussing passage of Williams-
Cole compromise bill and its provisions). The House also approved two amendments to the
Williams-Cole bill submitted by Paul N. Henry of Michigan and Fred Grandy of Iowa. Id.
The Henry language requires the Chairman of the NEA to consider during the grant-making
procedures "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public," in addition to the standards of artistic excellence. Id. The Grandy amend-
ment "softened" the provision that barred an artist found guilty of violating obscenity standards
from receiving NEA funding for three years. Id. Instead, the amendment provided that the
artist may receive a new grant upon repaying the artist's original grant. Id.
121. See Andrews, House Says No to Anti-Obscenity Limits on NEA Funding, supra note
118, at 7, col 1 (discussing decision by House to eliminate anti-obscenity restrictions and to
allow courts to determine obscenity).
122. Id.
123. See Masters, Frohnmayer Welcomes Senate NEA Bill, supra note 114 (discussing
provisions of Senate bill to reauthorize NEA without content restrictions). The Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee earlier approved the Senate bill. Id.; Berke, House Approves
Compromise Bill to Continue Arts Endowment, supra note 115, at Al, col. 2 (stating that
reauthorization of bill being considered by Senate is "awaiting action on the Senate floor");
Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-Committee Offers Compromise On Long-Delayed NEA Bill,
CONGRSSIONAL. QUARTERLY, Sept. 15, 1990, at 2920 (discussing Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee approved plan to reauthorize NEA without content restrictions on funding
and to allow judicial determination of obscenity). The Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee defeated an amendment proposed by Senator Daniel R. Coats of Indiana, which
"would bar grants for obscene projects, for the sexual exploitation of minors and for attacking
historically religious tenets, traditions, symbols or figures." Id.
124. See Appropriations Act of 1991, supra note 15 (reauthorizing NEA and amending
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965); See also Masters, Congress
Approves Arts Funding Compromise, supra note 15, at A17, col. 2 (discussing provisions of
Interior Appropriations bill reauthorizing NEA).
125. See Masters, Congress Approves Arts Funding Compromise, supra note 15, at A17,
col. 3 (discussing provisions of 1991 Appropriations Act as compromise legislation).
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funded art. 26 However, the law requires the chairman of the NEA to
consider general standards of decency and respect for the diyerse beliefs
and values of the American public throughout grantmaking procedures. 27
The law no longer requires artists to sign an anti-obscenity pledge, but
instead provides for a judicial determination of obscenity and empowers
the NEA to recoup funds from recipients who use their grants to create
obscene art.128
Although the new law removes explicit content restrictions on the type
of art that the NEA may fund, and, therefore, seems to address the concerns
of the Independent Commission, artists still may not be able to enjoy their
right to freedom of expression without restrictions on creativity that an
anti-obscenity oath poses. 2 9 Significant problems inherent in the decency
clause include close scrutiny of experimental and challenging works of art,
and vague language in the clause. 30 The requirement that the NEA chairman
126. Appropriations Act of 1991, supra note 15, § 103; See also Masters, Congress
Approves Arts Funding Compromise, supra note 15, at A17, col. 2 (discussing provisions of
1991 Appropriations Act regarding funding of art by NEA).
127. See Appropriations Act of 1991, supra note 15, § 103(b) (amending standard by
which NEA may fund art); See also Masters, supra note 15, Congress Approves Arts Funding
Compromise, at A17, col. 3. (discussing provisions of 1991 Appropriations Act regarding NEA
funding of art).
128. See Appropriations Act of 1991, supra note 15, § 102 (providing for judicial
determination of obscenity). Section 102 states:
... Section 3 of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of
1965 (20 U.S.C. 952), as amended by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the
end the following:
"(j) The term 'determined to be obscene' means determined, in a final judgment
of a court of record and of competent jurisdiction in the United States, to be
obscene..
Id., § 102(c).
See also Masters, Congress Approves Arts Funding Compromise, supra note 15, at A17,
col. 1, 5 (stating Appropriations Act of 1991 provides for judicial determination of obscenity);
supra notes 93-111 (discussing pledge requirement as prior restraint on artists' expression).
The provision of the 1991 Appropriations Bill allowing for a judicial determination of
indecency resolves some of the problems inherent in the prior restraint cases. See supra notes
102-11 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of judicial hearing prior to restraint of
material). For example, under the new 1991 legislation, a work of art may be created before
it is subject to censorship. This Note does not explore, however, the remedial problem involving
recoupment of money from the artist subsequent to a judicial determination of obscenity.
129. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect that vagueness
of NEA pledge requirement creates); supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text (discussing
pledge requirement as prior restraint on artist's expression).
130. See Masters, Congress Approves Arts Funding Compromise, supra note 15, at A17,
col. 4 (discussing provisions of Interior Appropriations Bill that reauthorized NEA). Repre-
sentative Sidney R. Yates, Chairman of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, commented
that he disliked the decency provision. Id. Representative Yates stated that because of the
decency language, "experimental and 'challenging' works will be subject to very close scrutiny
under that clause." Id.; see also infra notes 162-78 and accompanying text (discussing definition
of indecency in 1991 legislative language as vague under broadcasting standards and in view
of NEA).
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ensure that grantmaking procedures consider general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public,
therefore, still may cause the adverse effects to the creativity of the arts in
this country that the Independent Commission sought to avoid.,',
Because members of Congress previously rejected the decency language
in prior legislation, 1 2 perhaps anticipating the same effects that the Inde-
pendent Commission feared, it is surprising that Congress adopted the
"decency" language into the 1991 Appropriations bill.13 3 When Congress
voted on the Helms Amendment to the 1990 Appropriations Act, Congress
deleted language that prohibited funding of "indecent" works of art, in
addition to "material which denigrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents
of a particular religion or nonreligion," and "material which denigrates,
debases, or reviles a person, group, or class of citizens on the basis of race,
creed, sex, handicap, age or national origin."' 34 One of the reasons for the
rejection of such prohibitive language was that Congress believed the ban
extended too far, restricting citizens' First Amendment rights to free speech. 35
One senator opposed the prohibition against indecency because, unlike the
United States Supreme Court's test for obscenity, no legal definition for
indecency existed and indecency, therefore, would be almost impossible to
define.13 6
The legislative history of the proposed amendment language to the
Appropriations Act of 1991 suggests that Congress intended to interpret
indecency under the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) definition
of "indecent. 11 37 An analysis of indecency in the broadcast context indicates
131. See supra notes 44-63, 75-111 and accompanying text (discussing adverse effects of
NEA pledge requirement); infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect
that will result from imposition of indecency provision).
132. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing deletion of "decency"
language from Helms Amendment).
133. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of decency
language in Helms Amendment, and adoption of decency language into 1991 Appropriations
bills).
134. 135 CONG. REC. 58862 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (Helms Amendment No. 420); see
Houston & Davis, Conferees Agree to Ban Funding for 'Obscene Art', L.A. Times, Sept. 30,
1990, at Al, col.3 (discussing Senate vote to scale down Helms Amendment). The Senate
voted 65 to 31 to accept amendment language proposed by Senators Wyche Fowler and Warren
B. Rudman, prohibiting funding only of "obscene" art. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Helms's Victory, Proprietary to the United Press International, Oct. 16, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (discussing Senator Simpson's opposition to
proposed Helms amendment).
137. Zuckman, Obscenity Debate-Compromise on Arts Funding is Ready for House
Vote, CoNoGmoNAL QuARTERLY, Oct. 6, 1990, at 3236. Representative Paul B. Henry
proposed language to prohibit funding of works that "deliberately denigrate" the cultural
heritage of the United States, its religious traditions, or racial or ethnic groups, are "obscene"
under Supreme Court standards, or are "indecent" under the definition of the FCC. Id. The
article reports that as a "nod" to Rep. Henry, the adopted compromise language included the
decency clause. Id.; see also infra notes 139-46, 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing how
FCC interprets indecency).
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that such a standard is wholly inapplicable to judging the merit of a work
of art because the government justifies its regulation of the content of
broadcasting almost entirely on the basis of the protection of young children
as listeners and viewers. 138 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation39 defendant
broadcasted an afternoon monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," which dis-
cussed the uses of "words you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves
..."'40 The FCC sought to regulate the speech as a statutory violation
against the use of "obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communications.' 4' The FCC defined the concept of indecency as
"connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children might be in
the audience."' 42 The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the
FCC's definition of indecency, concluding that the normal definition of
indecency was nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.'
41
Applying this definition of indecency to the FCC's action against Pacifica,
the Court held that even if speech is offensive to contemporary moral
standards,' 44 the FCC does not have a sufficient reason to suppress speech.
45
The Court viewed the words of the monologue in the context of the
broadcast, however, and held that the monologue was indecent because of
the repetitive use of the seven offensive words during the afternoon. 1
The holding in Pacifica raises the issue of offensive expression in the
broadcasting medium. 47 The United States Supreme Court, in Pacifica,
recognized that freedom of expression receives the most limited protection
in the broadcast medium of communication.'" The Court presented two
reasons for distinguishing broadcast from other mediums of expression:
first, offensive material broadcast on the airwaves confronts a listener in
the privacy of the home as well as in public, and, therefore, the individual's
right to privacy outweighs the First Amendment rights of a communicator;
138. See infra notes 139-61 and accompanying text (analyzing inapplicability of indecency
in broadcasting context for judging merit of work of art).
139. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
140. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
141. Id. at 731 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.)).
142. Id. at 731-32 (citing FCC declaratory order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (Feb. 21, 1975)).
143. Id. at 740. The Court looked to the dictionary for defimition of indecency: 'a:
altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would
dictate as right or expected or appropriate; hardly suitable: UNSEEMLY... b: not conforming
to generally accepted standards of morality:. . ."' Id. (citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (1966)).
144. Id., 438 U.S. at 745.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 747-50.
147. See infra notes 148-61 and accompanying text (discussing differences between broad-
casting and non-broadcasting First Amendment expression such as creation of art and why
different standards are necessary for each).
148. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
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second, broadcasting is accessible to children, and the government's interest
in protecting children similarly outweighs freedom of expression. 49 The
Court limited its holding in Pacifica to allow the FCC to regulate and
prohibit indecent broadcasting after a consideration of botli the time of day
of the broadcast and the content of the program.'"
Allowing the FCC to regulate broadcasts of indecency is distinguishable
from the NEA's regulation of funding of a work of art.'s' A work of art
that is indecent is not expressed through a medium that directly confronts
a viewer in the privacy of one's home. Moreover, a work of art, unlike a
radio broadcast, does not pose the risk of subjecting the viewer or listener
to unexpected program content.5 2 Although art exists in many public places,
an individual may avoid exhibitions in museums when a museum posts a
warning to viewers about the possible offensiveness of some of the works
exhibited. Furthermore, a work of art is not uniquely accessible to chil-
dren.'
The United States Supreme Court, in Cohen v. California,'54 drew
similar distinctions between viewers and listeners.'55 In Cohen defendant
Cohen wore a jacket that displayed the words "Fuck the Draft" in a
corridor of the county courthouse.5 6 The Los Angeles Municipal Court
convicted Cohen for offensive conduct, and the Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia affirmed the conviction.'5 The United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the First Amendment protected Cohen's communication, and
held that, absent a substantial invasion of an individual viewer's privacy
interest, the state cannot violate the communicator's freedom of speech or
expression.' The Court distinguished between people confronted at the
courthouse with Cohen's jacket and those confronted with the same ex-
pression at their private residences.5 9 The Court characterized the public as
149. Id. at 748-49.
150. Id. at 750.
151. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text (discussing why creation of art may
be distinguished from broadcasting in effect on viewers); but see Note, To Air or Not to Err:
The Threat of Conditioned Federal Funds for Indecent Programming on Public Broadcasting,
42 Hastings L.J. 635 (1991) [hereinafter To Air or Not to Err] (analogizing 1990 legislative
obscenity restrictions on visual arts to FCC regulation of broadcasting and concluding that
twenty-four hour ban on indecency is unconstitutional).
152. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
153. Id. at 749.
154. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
155. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
156. Id. at 16.
157. Id. at 16-17.
158. Id. at 21.
159. Id. at 21-22. Justice Harlan commented that:
... [P]ersons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite different posture than,
say, those subjected to the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their
residences. Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. And, while it may
be that one has a more substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when
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captive to offensive and objectionable speech once outside the privacy of
the home, 160 and held that the government may not suppress speech such
as Cohen's that is offensive, shocking or inconsistent with the public
morality. 16'
In addition to the inapplicability of the broadcasting definition of
indecency to the visual arts, a further problem arises because the definition
of indecency continues to raise problems of vagueness.1 62 Both broadcasters
and individuals involved 'in the NEA view the definition of decency in the
broadcasting context as inherently vague. 163 Members of the NEA literature
grantmaking panel resigned from their positions in protest of the decency
provision. 64 Subsequently, the NEA literature grantmaking panel demanded
that the NEA chairman clarify the decency standard. 165 Panelists concerned
about the language wanted the NEA Chairman explicitly to state that artistic
merit is the basis for grantmaking in the application procedure. 66 Even the
NEA Chairman, John Frohumayer, indicated concern over the indecency
provision. 167
Broadcasters, also, have challenged the meaning of "indecency" since
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Pacifica.1 6s Following Pacifica,
walking through a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central
Park, surely it is nothing like the interest in -being free from unwanted expression
in the confines of one's own home.
Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also supra note 86 (discussing viewpoint discrimination in government
funding); Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Kathleen M.
Sullivan, at 6. Professor Sullivan argues that the "government may not ban-or deny funding
to-'indecent' or 'homoerotic' art. Such terms are inherently geared to the viewpoint of the
artists or the anticipated viewpoint of the audience." Id.
162. See infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text (discussing broadcasting definition of
indecency as vague in eyes of both broadcasters and NEA).
163. See infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing reactions by NEA panel
members and director to decency provision and ongoing clarification of definition of indecency
by broadcasters).
164. See Masters, Some Resign Adjourned NEA Panel, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1990, at
B10, col. 1 (discussing resignation of members of NEA literature panel). Nine members of an
eleven-member NEA literature panel resigned in protest of the Congressional requirement that
grantmaking procedures consider general standards of decency. Id. Panel member Helaine
Harris declared that decency is too vague a term by which to make a judgment, that the term
is restrictive, and that it is subject to different interpretations. Id. at B10, col. 2.
165. See Masters, What Makes for Indecency? NEA Panel Seeks Clear Wording, Wash.
Post, Nov. 15, 1990, at C2, col. 1 (discussing response of NEA literature and playwright panel
members to decency provision and definition of decency in broadcasting context):
166. Id.
167. See Masters, Arts Chief Refuses to Be 'Decency Czar'-Hill Staff Critical of Reaction
to New Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 1990, at Bl, col. 5 (discussing reaction to decency
provision). The legislation provides that the chairman of the NEA must ensure that the
grantmaking procedure takes into consideration standards of decency. Id. Frohnmayer stated
his refusal to reject a grant on the basis that the grant violates the decency provision. Id. A
congressional aide commented that Frohnmayer appears to be delegating his authority to apply
the decency standard to panel members. Id. at B7, col. 3.
168. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court's holding and
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the FCC issued a public notice that expanded its regulation of indecency
beyond the type of indecent material at issue in that case.169 Broadcasters
affected by the public notice, alleging the standard was unconstitutionally
vague, requested a clarification of the indecency standards. 170 The FCC
responded by releasing a consideration order that rejected the vagueness
challenge. 71 The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, subsequently affirmed the FCC's indecency standard, holding that
the standard was not constitutionally overbroad and giving deference to the
Supreme Court in Pacifica, even though the District of Columbia Circuit
Court stated that vagueness was inherent in the definition of indecency.172
Following the FCC 's decision to enforce the indecency standard through a
blanket ban on broadcast indecency, petitioners again challenged the FCC's
standard, arguing once more that the definition of indecency is unconsti-
tutionally vague. 73 Currently the FCC standard remains in effect, as the
rationale in Pacifica case that George Carlin's seven dirty words were indecent and therefore
FCC had authority to regulate broadcast of Carlin monologue); see also infra notes 169-74
and accompanying text (discussing broadcasters' action, subsequent to Pacifica, to clarify
definition of indecency).
169. See New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to all Broadcast and
Amateur Radio Licensees, 62 Rad.Reg. 2d (P&F) 1218 (1987). The FCC defined indecency as
"language or material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
or organs." Id. at 1219.
170. See Note, To Air or Not to Err, supra note 151, at 661 (discussing making of more
stringent changes in indecency standard by FCC since 1987). Broadcasters argued that the
standard was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, creating a chilling effect on editorial
freedom, because the standard did not clearly distinguish between obscenity and indecency.
Id. (citing In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C. Rec. 930, paras. I n. 1, para 7, 28
(1987)).
171. See Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C. Rcd 930 (1987) (rejecting vagueness challenge,
adopting view for need for "safe harbor" hours for adults to view material and rejecting
proposition for blanket ban on indecent speech).
172. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("Act I"), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39
(D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT I] (inferring from Pacifica holding that Court did not view
FCC definition of indecency as so vague that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application"). The United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, held that the standard is not overbroad in failing to take
exception to material with serious merit, because serious merit could not preclude government
action when the interest of the government is the protection of children. Id. at 1340. The Act
I court additionally referred to the Supreme Court's noting of the FCC definition of indecency
in Pacifica to indicate "patent offensiveness." Id. at 1339 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740).
173. See Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 464, 4 F.C.C. 457, 457-458 (1988) (stating that FCC will enforce standard of
indecency provided in 18 U.S.C. § 464 on twenty-four hour basis in accordance with Pub. L.
No. 100-459). The FCC acted in response to government legislation ordering the FCC to
enforce the twenty-four hour ban against indecency. See Making Appropriations for the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies for the
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1989, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608
(1988).
See also Note, To Air or Not to Err, supra note 151, at 669 (commenting that FCC
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latest constitutional challenge resulted in an affirmation of the standard as
protecting the compelling government interest to "safeguar[d] the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor."1 74
The controversial and vague language of the FCC indecency standard,
if applied by the NEA, invites a chilling effect similar to that which the
legal task force of the Independent Commission and the court in Bella
Lewitsky envisioned as resulting from the NEA's anti-obscenity pledge
requirement. 75 The more innovative and experimental federally funded art
surely will suffer as a result of the decency clause, because the NEA may
choose not to award grants to such art for fear of coming close to the line
of indecency.176 Even if the decency clause is not an explicit restriction
against art that an artist may create with federal funds, the decency clause
still directs the chairman of the NEA to award grants only after considering
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and*values
of the American public. 177 Consequently, the NEA may deny funding to
any art that falls within this grey area of indecency. The government should
not, however, overlook the qualities of art that warrant federal funding,
such as the fresh vision that the art may bring to the public, 78 even if the
definition of indecency is unconstitutionally vague). The FCC standard of indecency is vague
because neither the courts nor the FCC clearly defined the requirement that the material be
"patently offensive." Id. The FCC instead maintains that it will make such a determination
depending on the context of the material. Id.
174. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("Act II"), 932 F. 2d 1504, 1509 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), reh'g denied (August 28, 1991). In Act 11 broadcasters petitioned for review of the
FCC order that imposed a blanket ban on broadcast material that the FCC determined
indecent. Id. at 1506. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the order, alleging vagueness
and overbreadth. Id. at 1507. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, held that its decision in Act I governed resolution of the issues of unconstitutionality,
and rejected petitioners' challenge to the definition of indecency. Id. at 1508. The Act II court
cited its deference to the Supreme Court in Act 1, stating "In our view, the Supreme Court's
decision in Pacifica dispelled any vagueness concerning the definition." Id., citing Act I, 852
F. 2d at 1338-39. The Act H court concluded that the FCC could regulate indecent material,
since such material could have a negative effect on children. Id. at 1508. The court held,
however, that the FCC must provide reasonable times that broadcasters may air such material,
and rejected a total ban by the FCC of indecent material. Id. at 1509.
175. See supra notes 49-57, 112-13 and accompanying text (describing statements by
Independent Commission's legal task force and court's rationale in Bella Lowitsky that NEA
pledge requirement creates chilling effect); see also infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text
(stating that indecency clause of 1991 Appropriations language creates similar chilling effect).
176. See supra note 130 (quoting statement by Senator Yates in reference to decency
language and probable effects).
177. See supra notes 125-28 (discussing language of 1991 Appropriations Bill for funding
art).
178. See Testimony of the Legal Task Force, supra note 52, Statement of Floyd Abrams,
at 4 (commenting that funding only art that is "safe" ignores qualities that should warrant
public funding). Floyd Abrams, a First Amendment attorney, directly and candidly expressed
a significant concern when he commented:
If we are to fund the arts at all, we should take the arts as they are ... to fund
artistic expression only if it is 'safe' art or 'responsible' art is simply to ignore the
qualities of art that should lead to its public funding in the first place-its freshness
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work of art falls within that grey area. The government also must not
forget that the First Amendment protects indecent speech.
17 9
Congress created the NEA to foster the creation of art in the United
States,'8 0 and restrictions on art must not inhibit that purpose. The primary
basis for NEA funding of the arts should be a criteria of artistic excellence
alone. Congress invaded the pure standard of artistic value in its initial
imposition of restrictions in the 1990 legislation.' 8' In that legislation,
Congress forbade the NEA from funding art that Congress considered
obscene.'8 2 Following controversy over the pledge requirement which the
public called censorship, Congress reconsidered the language directed toward
the funding of the arts.183 Congress left the public with a provision that
Congress asserts is less restrictive, and which directs the NEA to consider
general standards of decency in its grantmaking.'8 Yet, the decency provision
of the 1991 legislation also presents new legal problems of vagueness to the
NEA procedures. 8 5 Even the NEA, the federal agency employed to carry
out the 1991 legislation, hesitates to apply such vague standards. 86 Because
the NEA may decide not to fund indecent creations, which is expression
protected by the First Amendment,'1 and because the NEA's failure to
fund art that the NEA considers indecent could result in a multiplier effect
of non-federal refusal to fund artists' works, 8 the arts may suffer more
from the 1991 legislative language than from the pledge requirement imple-
mented in the 1990 Appropriations Act. Congress ignored the recommen-
dation of the Independent Commission to avoid legislative restrictions in
arts funding. 8 9 Instead, in the form of the Appropriations Act of 1991,
of vision, its willingness to look anew at what the rest of us overlook and are
incapable of seeing.
Id.
179. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(holding that indecent expression that is not obscene is protected by First Amendment); Action
for Children's Television v. FCC ("Act I"), 852 F.2d at 1344 (holding that First Amendment
protects broadcast material that is indecent but not obscene).
180. See supra note 24 (discussing creation of NEA and governmental purposes for its
creation).
181. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing 1990 Appropriations lan-
guage).
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional proposals
for reauthorization of NEA).
184. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing decency provision of 1991
Appropriations bill).
185. See supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text (discussing issues of vagueness raised
by new decency clause).
186. See supra notes 164-67 (discussing NEA Chairman's refusal to act as "decency Czar,"
and resignation of panel members in protest of vague term "indecency").
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court holdings that
indecent and not obscene material is protected by Constitution).
188. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (commenting on court's discussion in
Bella Lewitsky of multiplier effect of NEA decision not to fund obscene art).
189. See Independent Commission Report, supra note 13, at 89 (setting out specific
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Congress passed legislation that is inappropriate, 190 restrictive and unconsti-




At the time of publication of this Note, the controversy over federal
funding of the arts continues. At present, Congress is debating over the
correct standard by which to make the 1992 fiscal appropriations to the
NEA. The House of Representatives has passed a bill which maintains that
NEA grants must satisfy a standard of decency. The Senate, however, has
gone one step further in restricting the 1992 NEA funding. Supporting an
amendment proposed by Senator Helms and, observe, adapted from FCC
broadcasting language, the Senate seeks to prohibit materials that "depict
or describe, in a patently offensive way,' sexual or excretory activities or
organs." Representative Yates correctly noted in opposition to the amend-
ment that "Art that is patently offensive to Senator Helms may not be
objectionable to other people, and that's been recognized by the Supreme
Court."
recommendation to Congress about NEA reauthorization). The Independent Commission made
the recommendation against content restrictions, stating that criteria in addition to artistic
excellence should not be "isolated and treated as exogenous considerations." Id.
190. See supra notes 149, 153 (concluding that government regulation of indecency is
more appropriate in broadcasting medium because government interest in that area is for
protection of children).
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